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690 GoLDING 11. R.K.O. PICTURES, INO. [35 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 20699. In Bank. August 4, 1950.1 
SAMUEL R. GOLDING et al., Respondents, v. R.K.O. 
PICTURES, INC. (8 Corporation) et a1., Appellants. 
[1] Literat7 Property-Infringement-BlementB.-To recover for 
infringement or piracy of an author's common-law right iD 
literary property, three elements must be established: owner-
ship by plaintifl' of a protectible property interest; UD-
authorized copying of the material by defendant; and damage 
resulting from the copying. 
[2] IcL-Nature and Bxtent uf Right.-Literary property in the 
fruits of a writer's creative endeavor extend to the ful~ scope 
of bis inventiveness, and this may include, in the case of 
a stage play or a moving picture scenario, the entire plot, 
the unique dialogue, the fundamental emotional appeal or 
theme of the story, or merely certain novel sequences or com-
binations of otherwise hackneyed elements. 
[3] Id.-Nature an~ Extent of Right.-It is only the product of 
a writer's creativ l mind which is protectible in an action for 
infringement of his literary property. 
[4] Id.-Remedies-Bvidence.-Inasmuch as there will seldom be 
direct evidence of plagiarism, the trier of fact must neces-
sarily rely on circumstantial evidence and the reasonable 
inferences which may be drawn from it to determine the 
issu,e; 
[6] Id.-Remedies-Bvidence.-An inference of copying a literary 
work which will support an allegation of plagiarism may arise 
when there is proof of access coupled with a showing of 
similarity. 
[6] Id.-Remedies-Bvidence.-Where there is strong evidence 
of an alleged infringer's access to plaintiff's literary work, 
less proof of similarity in the alleged infringing work may 
suffice to prove plagiarism; conversely, if the evidence of 
access is uncertain, strong proof of similarity should be 
shown before the inference of copying may be indulged. 
[7] Id.-Similarity of Identity of CompositionB.-In determining 
the question of similarity between plaintiff's literary property 
and the alleged infringing work, it is only similarity as to 
plaintiff's protectible property that is relevant; thus where 
[I} See 16 CaLJur. 665; 34 Am.Jur. 448. 
McB:. Dig. References: [1-17, 19J Literary Property; (18J 
Evidence, § 527. 
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the property interest in a play or scenario entitled to pro-
tection extends only to certain sequences or characters, simi-
larity of the plaintiff's and defendant's works as to other 
phases of the play or scenario is irrevelant. 
[8J Id. - Bemedies - Damages.-The rules governing the deter-
mination of damages for infringement or piracy of a play-
wright's protectible interest in his literary work are the 
same as apply to any other form of personal property. 
[9] Id.-Bemedies-Evidence.-The central dramatic situation of 
a play entitled "The Man and His Shadow," emphasizing a 
ship captain's controlling monomania for authority and 
power, was shown to constitute protectible literary property 
by evidence that this theme rather than the specific dia-
logues or sequence of scenes constituted the truly original 
and valuable feature of the story, and by the fact that it 
was not a mere abstract idea but had been reduced to the 
form of a full stage play. 
[10] Id.-Subject Matter-Originality.-The fact that the plan or 
theme of a story is similar to the plots of prior stories does 
not defeat the claim of originality within the meaning of that 
word for copyright purposes. 
[11] Id.-Bemedies-Evidence.-In an action for plagiarism of 
a play by the producers of a motion picture, opportunity and 
inclination to pirate plaintiffs' literary property was sup-
ported by testimony that the play was submitted to defendant 
producer to read and consider, that in one of plaintiffs' di.&-
cussions with the producer regarding the acceptability of the 
story for moving picture purposes the producer stated, "I 
don't have to buy my stories. I don't have to layout money 
for originals; . get my ide~ and I call in a couple of writer. 
in the lot and I make my stories that way," and that the 
manuscript was returned to plaintiffs a few days later. 
[l2J Id.-Bemedies-Evidence.-In an action for plagiarism of a 
play by the prodncers of a motion picture, proof of accesa 
establishes no more than the opportunity to copy and not 
actual copying, and liability for damages must rest on sub-
stantial evidence of similarity between plaintiffs' literary 
property and the moving picture produced by defendants. 
[13J Id.-Bemedies-Appea.1-Beview of Evidence.-In an action 
for plagiarism of a play by the produllers of a motion picture, 
a determination by the jury of the issue of similarity is not 
conclusive on appeal unless it is supported by substantial 
evidence. 
[14] Id.-Bemedies-Evidence.-The mere existence of two dra-
matic works. in evidence does not, per Be, constitute 8ufticient 
evidence of similarity. It is necessary to read or view the 
) 
J 
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two works to see if they present any substantial similarity 
insofar as the complaining playwright's property in his work 
is concerned. 
[16) Id.-Infringement-Copying.-Where a motion picture con-
tains all the elements of the basic dramatic situation of a 
stage play alleged to be infringed, differences in the minor 
characters and the locale of the story go to the quality of the 
plagiarism and not to :ts existence or nonexistence. 
[18) Id.-Inrrmgement-Testa.-on the issue of originality of 
& stage play alleged to have been infringed by a moving pic-
ture, it is not necessary that comparison be made without 
dissecting the works, but dissection should first be mad~ to 
d~termine wherein plaintiff has a protectible property inter-
est, and, after establishing that he has a protectible property 
right, a c~mparison may then be made between the two works 
,as to the original and protectible portion only. 
[11) IcL-8imilarity or Identity of CompositiODS.-Where an au-
thor's protectible property right extends only to a portion of 
a play, to its dramatic core, the comparison of such play with 
an alleged infringing moving picture must be OD the basis 
. of an average observer looking at that portion. 
[18] Evtdence-OpiDion Evidence-Values.-An owner of a dra-
matic play is competent, without being quali1l.ed as an expert, 
to testify as to the value or worth of the property. 
[19) Literar)' Property-Remedies-Damages.-In an action for 
infringement of a play by the produCers of a motion picture, 
testimony of the playrights that the value of the play before 
the infringement was between $25,000 and $50,000 and that 
it had DO value after the production and distribution of the 
picture supported an award of $25,000 for its infringement. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Loa 
Angeles County and from ano~der denying motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict. Ingall W. Bull, Judge. Af-
firmed. 
Action for damages for infringement of literary property. 
Judgment for plaintiffs afBrmed. 
Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp and Guy Knupp for Appel. 
lants. 
Loeb & Loeb and Herman F. Selvin, Amici Curiae on be-
half of Appellants. 
Harold A. Fendler for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J .-In an action for the infringement of 
literary property, the producers of a motion picture appeal 
Aug. 1950] GOLDING fl. R.K.O. PICTURES, INo. 693 
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from a judgment awarding the authors of the assertedly 
plagiarized stage play damages ill the sum of $25,000. The 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgmellt is the 
principal question presented for decision. 
Samuel R. Golding and Norbert Faulkner, both well· 
established writers, collaborated in writing a play. entitled, 
"The Man and His Shadow." They neither published nor 
dedicated it to the public and it was not copyrighted. The 
Pasadena Playhouse produced the play in December, 1942. 
After the authors made some revisions, they submitted it to 
R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., and Val Lewton, a producer. 
Lewton retained the manuscript for about six weeks. At 
that time, according to the evidence, Lewton was looking 
for a story with the action on board a ship in order to utilize 
an old set which was available. The appellants admit accesS 
to the play in that a copy of it was in the custody of Lewton for 
some time. 
In August, 1943, the appellants released the motion picture 
entitled "The Ghost Ship" and this action followed. Upon the 
trial, the play was read to the jurors and the motion picture 
was shown to them. After they returned a verdict for damages 
in the amount of $25,000, a motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict was denied. The appeal is from the 
judgment and from the order denying the motion. 
The .central dramatic situation or core in which the plain-
tifi's claim property is as follows: The action takes place on 
board a ship. Only one person aboard, a passenger, suspects 
the captain of being a murderer. He accuses the captain who 
neither admits nor denies the acctlsation; in fact, to his crew 
and passengers the captain clearly implies that his accuser is 
either guilty of hallucinations or himself desires to kill him. 
t The accuser knows that he is subject to the captain's whims 
1;·· and is in a position where he can be killed or imprisoned. 
~ The captain, sure of his authority, informs the accuser that he 
is free to try to convince anyone on board ship of the truth of 
his suspicions. The passenger tells his story to the first mate 
and to others on the ship but they refuse to believe him and 
instead suspect the passenger of hallucinations or malice •. r 
, Finally, however, the captain becomes aware that he is sus-1 . peeted by at least one other person and he threatens to kill, 
I or does kill that person as an intermeddler. Knowledge that 
! his murders are about to be uncovered causes him to lose bia t mind and brings about his own undoing and death. 
, 
I 
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In the plaintiffs' play this basic dramatic core waa filled· 
out by placing the passengers and crew upon a pleasure' 
cruise and making the captain an imposter who haa come! 
to show his superiority to the man in whose shadow he \ 
has worked for years. This man is the person throughout who I 
knows the captain's true identity. There are various other: 
subcharacters who give body and filling to the central plot, but: 
aa testifi.ed. to by both GOld.ing and Faulkner, this matter waa \' 
all superficial and could be changed in innumerable ways with-
out affecting the literary property and its value. I 
The moving picture "Ghost Ship" has its captain aa the 
dominant figure of the story. .The locale of the drama is on a 
freighter with members of the crew having the subordinate 
roles. The ship carries no passengers and, to that extent, the 
minor characters are quite different from those in the play. 
However, the captain and his obsession with authority and the 
fact that no one aboard can successfully challenge his· posi-
tion is found in the picture, as is the dramatic struggle between 
the captain and his adversary, the one person who knows his 
true nature. Basically, the psychological situation is that 
described by the plaintiffs aa the dramatic core of their work. 
The producers contend that the evidence does not support 
the finding of plagiarism. The correct standard for making 
a comparison between the play and the picture, they aasert, 
is that of an ordinary observer; if dissection, rather than ob-
servation, is necessary to determine the question of similarity, 
a finding of infringement is unwarranted. They also claim 
that the evidence is insufficient to support the award of dam-
ages. In answer, the respondents argue -thatH'Whether -01'---;-
not similarities are apparent to an • ordinary observer' and : 
support a finding of copying is a question of fact upon which 
the jury's unanimous determination is conclusive." 
[1] The rights aaserted in this caae are not baaed upon 
statutory copyright but stem from the so-called common-law 
copyright. (Civ. Code. § 980.) Upon such a cause of action, 
to recover for infringement, or piracy, of literary property, 
three elements must be established: (1) ownership by the 
plaintiff of a protectible property interest; (2) unauthorized 
eopying of the material by the defendant; and (3) damage 
resulting from the copying. (See Caruthera v. B.E.O. Radio 
Picturu, 1M., 20 F. Supp. 906, 907.) 
[2] Literary property in the fruits of a writer's creative 
endeavor extend to the full scope of his inventiveness. This 
may well include, in the ease of a stage play or tQ.OVing picture 
) 
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scenario, the entire plot, the unique dialogue, the fundamental 
emotional appeal or theme of the story, or merely certain 
novel sequences or combinations of otherwise hackneyed ele-
ments. [3] It is, however, only the product of the writer's 
creative mind which isprotectible. If only a portion of the 
play or story is original and the remainder is but an orthodox 
collection of filler comprising matters in the public domain, 
the property right must be fully analyzed and closely defined, 
because in the subsequent determination of the issue of copy-
ing, it is necessary to make a comparison of the two works, 
and such comparison is of value only if it is based upon a 
correct determination of the issue as to the extent and nature 
of the plaintiff's protectible interest. 
The question as to whether the claimed original or novel idea 
has been reduced to concrete form is an issue of law. The 
determination of it must be made as a condition precedent to 
the vesting of any rights stemming from the common law copy-
right. The plaintiff must establish, as the subject of the 
cause of action, a right in the nature of property which is 
capable of ownership. Certainly, if the only product of the 
writer's creative mind is not something which the law recog-
nizes as protectible, that is, an idea not reduced to concrete 
, form (O'Brien v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 68 F.Supp. 13), no 
right of action for infringement of literary property will lie 
even if the idea assertedly infringed is original and the result 
of his independent labor. 
f.. 
'" 
[4] After a plaintiff has established a protectible property 
right, the further issue, common to (Ill copyright cases, statu-
tory or common law, is: Was the plaintiff's material copied 
by the defendant' There will seldom be direct evidence of 
plagiarism, and necessarily the trier of fact must rely upon 
circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences which 
may be drawn from it to determine the issue. 
[5] An inference of copying may arise when there is proof 
of access coupled with a showing of similarity. (Shipman v. 
R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 538; O'Rourke v. 
R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 44 F.Supp. 480, 482.) [6] Where 
there is strong evidence of access, less proof of similarity may 
suffice. Conversely, if the evidence of access is uncertain, strong 
proof of similarity should be shown before the inference of 
copying may be indulged. [7] It is particularly important to 
·keep clearly in mind, insofar as the question of similarity is 
concerned, that it is only similarity as to the plaintiff's pro-
) 
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tectible property which is relevant. Thus, if the property in-
terest entitled to protection extends only to certain sequences 
or characters, similarity of the plaintiff's and the defendant's 
works as to other phases of the play or scenario is wholly 
irrelevant. 
[8] If it is established that the plaintiff has a protectible 
property in his literary work and there was copying, the 
elements of liability for infringement or piracy are established 
and all that remains is the determination of damages. On this 
latter issue,· the rules are the same with regard to literary 
property as apply to any other form of personal property. 
(Barsha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 32 Cal.App.2d 556 [90 P.2d 
371]; Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 
354.) 
The plaintiffs do not claim that their entire play, or any 
particular sequence or dialogue, was directly or totally pirated. 
Their insistence throughout has been that the thing of value 
in their play is the central dramatic situation and the inter-
play of the dominant and secondary characters upon each 
other. All other characterizations and dialogue are admittedly 
nothing more than hackneyed filler which could be added or 
subtracted without affecting the value or substance of the 
plaintiffs' literary property. 
Golding testified that when Lewton became reluctant to 
purchase the play, he told the producer that a moving picture 
of "The Man and His Shadow" could be based upon very 
simple lines, and the action need not necessarily take place on 
a pleasure yacht. The story might well be played in all its 
dramatic aspects on a freighter, having an ordinary captain 
and an ordinary crew.. There is one important dramatic 
--- ---jlgure in-this 1llayand only one, he said, the captain, with 
his insane lust for power, driving to carry out his sadistic 
objectives. And as the production on the Pasadena stage was 
summarized by the witness, "the sub-story of the other charac-
ters seemed very much warped and almost trivial as compared 
to the figure of the captain who dominated the scene when he 
appeared. " 
[9] The first question presented for decision is whether 
this basic dramatic situation constitutes protectible literary 
property. On the subject of the use of such plots Faulkner, 
who formerly had been a; story editor at a studio, testified that 
"the basic duty of [the story editor] is to read a book or .•• 
play . . . and condense the story theme into two or three 
paps. This material is then 'UlBed for comereDCe8 with pro-
.Aug. 1950] GoLDING v. R.K.O. PICTURES, INO. 
[35 C.2d 690; 221 P.2d 951 
697 
ducers and executives of the studios so they don't have to read 
the whole book or play ...• You have in studios a great 
problem of budget. . . . That means the studio gives a pro-
ducer an assignment and says, 'Here is a story, but ... we 
don't want you to spend more than this amount of money for 
the production.' . . . Now in such cases, the story editor 
goes in and talks over the story with the producer, he says, 
'You can do this story ... , for the lower budget cost because 
you can eliminate certain incidents, certain persons, certain 
settings, so that you can create the same basic theme and 
powerful story ... .' " 
According to this evidence, the real value of a story or play 
may have little to do with specific dialogues or sequence of 
scenes or locale and there is ample evidence tending to prove 
that the basic dramatic core of the plaintiffs' play constitutes 
the truly original and valuable feature of it. Further, there 
was testimony to the effect that this particular psychological 
drama, with its emphasis upon the captain's controlling mono-
mania for authority and power, was particularly well timed 
with the early days of the war and, therefore, of unusual value 
at that time.· Nor was it a mere abstract idea. It had been 
reduced to the form of a full stage play. Its creators had 
embellished it with much of the trappings that give form, if 
not substance, to such literary work. 
[10] The fact that the plan or theme of the plaintiffs' story 
is similar to the plots of prior stories does not defeat the claim 
; of originality within the meaning of that word for copyright . 
Lpurposes. "It is not essential t1J.at any production, to be 
original or new within the meaning of the law of copyright, 
shall be different from another . . . the true test of originality 
is whether the production is the result of independent labor or 
of copying." (Drone, Copyrights, cited with approval in 
Fred Fishe,., Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 151; to same effect, 
Amdur on Copyrights, § 3, pp. 69, 70.) It is of no consequence 
that R.K.O. could have obtained the story from another source, 
; when there is strong evidence from which the jury has reason-
" ably concluded that the scenario of "Ghost Ship" was copied 
rfrom the plaintiffs' play. "Any subsequent person is, of 
~course, free to use all works in the public domain as sources for 
his compositions. No later work, though original, can take that 
; from him. But there is no reason in justice or law why he 
~. should not be compelled to resort to the earlier works them-
'.elves, or why he should be free to use the composition of 
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another, who himself has not borrowed. If he claims the rights 
of the public, let him use them j he picks the brains of the 
copyright owner as much, whether his original composition be 
old or new. The defendant's concern lest the public should 
be shut off from the use of works in the public domain is 
therefore illusory; no one suggests it." (Fred Fisher, Inc. v. 
Dillingham, supra, p. 150.) Or, as stated by Justice Holmes: 
•• Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to 
copy the copy." (Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 
188 U.S. 239, 249 [23 S.Ct. 298, 47 L.Ed. 460].) 
Concerning the issue of copying, and its subsidiary deter-
minations of access and similarity, the evidence as to access 
is strong. The producers of the motion picture have conceded 
access, but because the inference of copying must rest upon 
both access and similarity, it is necessary to examine, to a 
certain extent, the nature of the evidence of access. 
[11] It appears without conflict that the plaintiffs' play 
was submitted to Lewton to read and consider. Both Golding 
and Faulkner testified to conversations with Lewton regarding 
the acceptability of the story for moving picture purposes. In 
one of the discussions of it, according to Golding, Lewton 
stated: " Well, Golding, I don't have to buy my stories. I 
don't have to layout money for originals; I get my idea and 
I call in a couple of writers on the lot and I make my stories 
that way." It was a few days later that the manuscript was 
returned to plaintiffs. The evidence of opportunity and, 
indeed, inclination to pirate plaintiffs' literary property is, 
therefore, clearly supported by the evidence. 
[12] Proof of access, however, establishes no more than the 
opportunity to copy and not actual copying. (Kustoff v. 
Chaplin. 120 F.2d 551. 560; Cain v. Universal Pict1~res Co., 47 
F.Supp. 1013, 1015.) And liability for damages must rest 
upon substantial evidence of similarity between plaintiffs' 
literary property and the moving picture produced by the 
defendants. The play was read to the jury and the picture 
was viewed by them. There was no other evidence of similarity 
offered or received, and whether such evidence is sufficient to 
sustain the jury's implied finding of similarity is a question 
which can only be determined npon appeal by reading the 
play and seeing the moving picture, which have been done by 
this court. 
[13] The parties are directly at variance as to whether this 
issue of similarity presents a question of law or of fact. The 
onq direct statements in the cases appear to confirm the 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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playwrights' position that it is a question of fact for the jury. 
(Universal Pictures 00. v. Harold Lloyd Oorp., 162 F.2d 354, 
360; Dam v. Kirke La Shells 00.,166 F. 589.) However, they 
extend this point too far when they contend that the determi-
nation by the jury of this issue "is conclusive" upon appeal. 
No finding of fact is binding upon an appellate court if it is 
not supported by substantial evidence. The function of this 
court, when the contention of insufficiency is made, is to 
examine the record to ascertain whether there is evidence to 
support the verdict of the jury. 
[14] The situation presented by the issue of similarity is a 
peculiar one. There is always some evidence in the record. 
That is to say, if plagiarism is claimed there will always be a 
play by the plaintiff and one assertedly copied from it by the 
defendant. Yet the mere existence of two dramatic works in 
evidence does not. per se, constitute sufficient evidence of 
similarity. It is necessary to read or view the two works to 
see if they present any substantial similarity insofar as the 
piaintiff's property in his work is concerned. This is not 
to say that the appellate court will substitute itself for the 
jury to decide what it thinks of the issue of similarity; it is 
merely a question of determining if there is any substantial 
evidence of similarity to support the jury's finding. 
[15] In the present case, the movie "Ghost Ship" contains 
all the elements of the plaintiffs' basic dramatic situation. It 
is true that the story is placed on a freighter instead of a 
luxury cruiser, that it showed no passengers but only the crew 
aboard, and that there are many differences in the minor 
characters. "Evidence of these differences is relevant upon 
the question of [similarity] ... , but if such differences are 
shown to exist, the question remain!ol for the trier of fact to 
decide the issue." (Universal Pictures 00. v. Harold Lloyd 
Oorp., supra; Maurel v. Smith. 220 F. 195, 199: Sheldon v. 
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Oorp .• 81 F.2d 49. 56.) The basic 
factors of the play and the moving picture show strong simi-
larity in their respective plots although superficially there is 
considerable difference. But such differences go to the quality 
of the plagiarism, and not to its existence or nonexistence. 
[18] The appellants' main contention. however, is that in 
making a comparison of the two works, •• the standard of the 
ordinary observer should be applied-that is. the comparison 
should be made withont dissection of the works under observa-
tion and without expert or elaborate analysis." (Harold 
100 G<>LDING 11. R.K.O. PICTURES, INO. [35 C.2d 
Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 j Frankel v. Irwin, 34 
F.2d 142, 144; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692.) It is, 
therefore, argued that the court must look at the two plays as a 
whole to determine if they would impress the average observer 
as similar. The argument suffers from oversimplification. 
The rule of law stated is correct insofar as the issue of simi-
larity is concerned, but it has no application to the preliminary 
issue of originality or a plaintiff's protectible property 
interest. 
[17] It is essential from the nature of the inquiry as to 
originality to first dissect the play to determine wherein, if 
at all, plaintiffs have any protectible property right. Assum-
ing this is established, then comparison may be made between 
the two works as to the original and protectible portion only. 
If, as may often be the case, plaintiff's rights extend to the 
entire play, then the trier of fact should compare the one with 
the other. Whenever, as in Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System, ante, p. 653 [221 P.2d 73], the plaintiff establishes his 
owner$ip of an original combination and arr&ngement of 
various elements into a new plan for a radio broadcast, the 
comparison made by the trier of fact should be of that plan with 
the broadcast which was made by the defendant. But where, 
as in the present case, the plaintiffs' property rights extend 
only to the dramatic core of the play, the issue of similarity 
is accordingly limited· to a comparison on the basis of an 
average observer looking to that part of the literary work 
which can properly be protected from infringement. Other-
wise stated, dissection may be necessary to define the existence 
and extent of a plaintiff's property interest, and on the issue 
of similarity the test is always that of the average observer 
comparing such property interest with the alleged copy made 
by the defendant. 
[18, 19] In support of the appellants' contention that 
there is not sufficient evidence of the value of the damages sus-
tained by the authors of the play, it is argued that all of the 
evidence concerning the value of the motion picture rights is 
found in the testimony of the respondents, no person with 
experience in the determination of the value of such prop-
erty being called to testify on their behalf. But the testi-
mony of Faulkner, who stated his opinion in regard to the 
value of the play, was not necessary as an expert for both he 
and his coauthor testified as owners of the property. Each of 
them told the jury that the value of the play before the 
infringement was between $25,000 and $50,000 and that it had 
) 
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no value after the production and distribution of the picture. 
It is a well recognized rule that the owner of property is com-
petent to testify as to its worth. (10 Ca1.Jur. 1023.) "Literary 
property is not distinguished from other personal property 
and is subject to the same rules and is likewise protected. 
Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 538; 7 Am.Rep. 480. Cali-
fornia has held that plaintiffs may testify to the value of an 
unpublished manuscript prior to misappropriation in Barsha 
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 32 Cal.App.2d 556, 90 P.2d 371." 
(Unil1ersal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., supra.) The 
testimony of .the appellants' experts that the play contained 
no material of value for motion picture purposes merely 
created a conflict in the evidence. 
The judgment and the order denying the motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J. Dissenting.-The majority opinion in this 
case, unlike that in Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 
ante, p. 653 [221 P.2d 73], recognizes that the question 
whether there has been copying of plaintiffs' work cannot be 
submitted to the jury until it has been determined by the trial 
judge that there is evidence of substantial similarity between 
plaintiffs' play and defendants' motion picture with respect 
to the protectible features of plaintiffs' play. With these con-
1licting decisions before him, may a trial judge on motion for 
nonsuit or directed verdict determine on the authority of 
Golding v. R.K.O. whether there is relevant similarity between 
the two productions, and only if there is such similarity, deny 
the motion and submit th~ case to the jury' Or must he, on 
the authority of Stanley v. C.B.S., deny the motion without 
consideration of the issue of relevant similarity and let the case 
go to the jury before determining whether plaintiff established 
a cause of action upon which the case could properly have gone 
to the jury' 
I cannot agree that a comparison of defendants' picture with 
plaintiffs' play reveals evidence of similarity not attributable 
to the use of a common idea, theme, or plot in the public domain 
and therefore not subject to exclusive appropriation by any 
author. I would therefore reverse the judgment. 
Under Civil Code section 980·. the author of an original 
composition has a property interest in it that will be protected 
) 
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against copying to the extent that it is marked by original 
expression in "a concrete form, in which the circumstances and 
ideas have been developed, arranged and put into shape." 
(Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 409; Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 
82 (19 S.Ct. 606, 43 L.Ed. 904].) That principle governs the 
determination of a charge of piracy, whether under federal or 
CQmmon law copyright. (Twentieth Century-Foz Film Corp. 
v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 893, 894, 897-898; Echevarria v. 
Warne,. Bros. Picture •• Inc., 12 F.Supp. 632, 634; Columbia 
Pictures Corp v. Krama. 65 N.Y.S.2d 67, 68.) 
"Exclusive ownership" is limited to the "representation or 
expression. " (Civ. Code, § 980.) Themes, ideas, and plots 
in books or plays are a common fund from which every author 
may draw the basic materials of his work without restriction. 
They are not subject to exclusive ownership, and no author can 
acquire a superior interest in a theme or plot by making an 
earlier use thereof. "The copyright cannot protect the funda-
mental plot which was common property long before the story 
was Written; it will protect the embellishments with which 
the author added elements of literary value to the old plot, 
but it will not operate to prohibit the presentation by someone 
else of the same old plot without the particular embellish-
ments." (London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696, 698-699 [145 
C.C.A. 582] ; Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 24; 
Lewys v. O'Neill, 49 F.2d 603, 607; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 
690,692; Nichols v. UnitJeral Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121, 
122; Cam v. Unive,.sal Pictures Corp .• 47 F.Supp. 1013, 1016; 
Della,. v: Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150 F.2d 612, 613; Shipman 
v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures Corp., 100 F.2d 533, 536; Fendler v. 
Morosco;253 -N;Y.-281,287· fl71N.E. 56] ; see Chafee, Reflec-
tions on the Law of Copyright, 45 Columb.L.Rev. 503, 513· 
514.) The author's only property interest is in the concrete 
form that he his developed by his own originality and crafts-
manship, the" arrangement and combination of the ideas . . . 
the form, sequence and manner in which the combination 
expresses the ideas." (Bowon v. Yankee Network, Inc., 46 
F.Supp. 62, 64.) 
Plaintitfs have developed an unprotectible plot into an orig • 
• ,' The author or proprietor of any composition iu letters or art hal 
aD exclusive ownership iu the representation or expression thereof as 
aaainst aU persons ueept one who originally and iudependently createe 
the _e or • aimUar eODl'008ition.·' 
) 
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inal play entitled to protection. The protection extends, how-
ever, only to its ., details, sequence of events, and manner of 
expression and treatment." (Barsha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 
32 Cal.App.2d 51)6, 561 [90 P.2d 371].) Even if defendants 
have taken from the play its plot, they have taken nothing of its 
expression and development to which alone plaintiffs can claim 
a superior right. 
Plaintiffs rely on a dictum in Dam v. Kirk La 8helle, 175 
F. 902, 907-908 [99 C.C.A. 392, 20 Ann.Cas. 1173, 41 L.R.A. 
N.S. 1002], that a basic plot may be protected by copyright. 
What the court there described as a "plot," however, was in 
fact the concrete form of plaintiff's literary work appropriated 
almost verbatim by the defendant. Any intimation that a plot 
apart from its development and expression in a concrete form 
is protectible should not have survived the decision of 8h'ip. 
man v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures Corp., supra, 100 F.2d 533, 536-
537, 538. (See, also, Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692; 
8heldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 53-54; 
Christie v. Cohan, 154 F.2d 827, 828.) 
The majority opinion, however, states that "the fact that 
a plan or theme of the plaintiffs' story is similar to the plots 
of prior stories does not defeat the claim of originality within 
the meaning of that word for copyright purposes." The impli-
cation is that the plot of the play is protected by copyright if 
plaintiffs conceived it independently of earlier stories in which 
it is found. It is settled, however, that the plot of a literary 
work is not protectible merely because the author has con-
ceived it independently. "We assume that the plaintiff's play 
is altogether original, even to an extent that in fact it is hard 
to believe. We assume further that, so far as it has been 
anticipated by earlier plays of which she knew nothing, that 
fact is immaterial. Still, as we have already said, her copy-
right did not cover everything that might be drawn from her 
play; its content werit to some extent into the public domain 
•.. Whatever may be the difficulties a priori, we have no ques-
tion on which side of the line this case falls. A comedy based 
on conflicts between Irish and Jews, into which the marriage 
·of their children enters, is no more susceptible of copyright 
than the outline of Romeo and Juliet." (Nichols v. Universal 
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122; 8heldon v. Metro-Goldw1l1' 
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54; De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 
408, 410; Echevarria v. Warner BrOB. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. 
6upp. 632, 635; Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 287 (I'll 
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N.E. 56] ; MacDonald v. Du Mauriu', 75 F.Supp. 655, 660; 
McConnor v. Kaufman, 49 F.Supp. 738, 744; Becker v. Loew's, 
Inc., 133 F.2d 889, 892, cert. den. 319 U.S. 772 [63 S.Ct. 1438, 
87 L.Ed. 1720] ; Heywood v. Jericho Co., 193 Misc. 905 [85 
N.Y.S.2d 464,468].) 
The majority opinion seeks to support the converse proposi-
tion by the cases of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 
188 U.S. 239 [23 S.Ct. 298, 47 L.Ed. 460], and Fred Fisher, 
Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145. Those decisions, however, sup-
port the rule of the Nichols and Sheldon cases and do not 
enunciate a rule contrary thereto. In Bleistein v. Donaldson, 
supra, infringement resulted from the defendants' identical 
reproduction in reduced size of plaintiff's lithographs of 
eircus scenes. Copying was admitted. As a defense it was 
alleged that plaintiff's lithographs were picturizations of 
actual scenes and living persons and he was not entitled to 
eopyright thereof .. The court held that the fact that the sub-
ject of the production was in the public domain did not excuse 
the theft of the concrete form in which plaintiff's original 
development of the subject was expressed. "It is obvious also 
that the plaintiff's case is not affected by the fact, if it be one, 
that the pictures represent actual groups-visible things . . . 
that fact would not deprive them of protection. The opposite 
proposition would mean that a portrait by Velasquez or 
Whistler was common property because others might try their 
hand on the same face. Others are free to copy the original. 
They are not free to copy the copy." (188 U.S. 239, 249.} It 
is clear that Justice Holmes regarded as protectible only 
plaintiff's originality of expression.· His holding that defend-
ants were not free to copy the original expression and devel-
opment of· a nonprotectible theme or subject cannot be dis-
torted to mean that others are precluded from giving the same 
theme a different form. One does not "copy the copy" 
merely by using the same subject or theme. The "whole con-
tribution may not be protected; for the defendants were en-
titled to use, not only all that had gone before, but even the 
plaintiffs' contribution itself, if they drew from it only the 
more general patterns; that is, if they kept clear of its • expres-
sion.'" (Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 
49, 54.) 
-The same explanation applies to Judge Learned Hand's decision in the 
Fred Fisher ease, holding that defendant'. identical duplication of 
plainti1f'. original variation of a musieal theme constituted copyright 
iDfringement. (298 F. at 150; see also bia conc1ll'riq opiBiOD in 8llipmo_ 
'Y.1l.K.O • ...,...) 
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Since "the degree of protection afforded by the copyright 
is measured by what is actually copyrightable in it; that is, 
by degree and nature of the original work" (American OodB 
Co. v. Bensinger, 282 F. 829, 834; Dorsey v. Old SurBty LifB 
Ins. 00.,98 F.2d 872, 873), similarity between the play and the 
picture not attributable to the copyrightable features of the 
play is irrevelant. (Harold Lloyd Oorp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 
1, 17 ; Nicko18 v. Uniflersal Pictures Oorp.,45 F.2d 119, 121; 
Oain v. Uniflersal Pictttres Oorp., 47 F.Supp. 1013, 1017; 
Affiliated Enterprises v. Grltber, 86 F.2d 958, 961; De MO'1&tijo 
v. Twentieth Oentury-Fox F'ilm Oorp., 40 F.Supp. 133, 138; 
Shipman v. B.E.O. Badio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 537; 
Rush v. Oursler, 39 F.2d 468, 473; Bosetl v. Loew's, Inc., 162 
F.2d 785, 788; Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 409; MacDonald 
v. Du Maurier, 75 F.Supp. 655. 662; Hewitt v. Ooward, 41 
N.Y.S.2d 498, 500; Oolumbia Picture. Oorp v. KrasM, 65 
N.Y.S.2d 67, 69; Heywood v. Jericho 00., 193 Misc. 905 [85 
N.Y.S.2d 464, 468] ; see dissenting opinion in Stanley v. O.B.S., 
antB, p. 653 [221 P.2d 73].) General similarity between 
two productions attributable to their use of a common plot 
drawn from the public domain, or similarity in incident 
attributable to the use of common sources of material, is not 
evidence of literary piracy. Unless "the two works, when 
compared, show such pronounced similarities of substantial 
portions of protectible material, i. e., of details, sequence of 
events, and manner of expression and treatment, as to warrant 
t the inference of copying," it is error to submit the issue' of 
~. copying to the jury. (Bar.ha v. Mefro-QoZdwyn.Mayer, 32 
L Oal.App.2d 556, 561 [90 P.2d 371].) t· Upon this principle, the federal and New York courts have l'..:. eonsistently reversed judgments for plaintiffs or granted mo-" tions for dismissal or for judgment on the pleadings for 
-. defendants when the only similarity between the two produc-
~. tions has been that attributable to the use of- a common plot. 
r> In Harold Lloyd Oorp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, the N'mth Circuit 
~. Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for plaintiff based on 
the trial court's' finding that defendant's motion picture had 
'. been copied from plaintiff's magazine story. Both works were 
'baSed on the same plot : A university freshman of little 
- physical ability, attempting to impress a coed with his athletic 
~prowess becomes involved in a number of ludicrous 8ituatio~ 
':that subject him to the ridicule of the student body. Throug~ 
35C.1d-13 
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a series of improbable events, he involuntarily becomes a game-
winning football hero and wins the love of the girl and the 
plaudits of his classmates. These similarities were held to be 
irrelevant, attributable only to the "use of common materials, 
and common sources of knowledge, open to all men." The 
court declared that "the resemblances are either accidental or 
arising from the nature of the subject" (65 F.2d at 17) and 
held that the "reproduction of such non-original matter," 
even though a conscious borrowing, is not actionable copying. 
(65 F.2d at 24.) 
In Omstein v. Paramount Productio7l8, Inc., 9 F.Supp. 896, 
plaintUf's story and defendant's motion picture were both 
based on a married woman's sacrifice of her honor to pay for 
her husband's medical care. In each story, the husband ac-
cepted the aid in ignorance of its source, and upon discovery 
indignantly repudiated his wife. Both story and picture de-
scribed the wife's struggle against adversity until her recon-
ciliation with her husband in the picture and her death in ~ 
the story. The court dismissed plaintiff's bill for failure to 
atate a cause of action, holding that the acknowledged similari-
ties lay only in a common plot in the public domain. Substan-
tial dissimilarities in treatment and development between the 
two productions were held as a matter of law to preclude a 
finding of copying. The same result was reached in the follow-
ing eases: Heywood v. Jericho 00., 193 Misc. 905 [85 N.Y.S.2d 
464] (both plays dealt with the retnrn of a Negro war hero 
to his native southern community, his love for a white girl, and 
their struggle against the bigotry, violence, and hatred of the 
white community) ; 004Zins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 
25 F.Supp. 781, 782 (both stories portrayed the life of a test 
pilot) ; L07ldon v. Biograph 00., 231 F. 696 [145 C.C.A. 582] 
(both stories dealt with the successful attempts of two thieves 
to poison each other to avoid a division of their spoils)·; Fendler 
v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281 [171 N.E. 561 (both plays were based 
on the love of a white youth for an Hawaiian girl) ; MacDonald 
v. Du Maurier, 75 F.Supp. 655 (the book "Rebecca" was 
alleged to have infringed a story by plaintiff concerned also 
with the conflict between a second wife and the spirit and 
memory of the first) ; McOonnor v. Kaufman, 49 F.Supp. 738 
(both plays dramatized the late Alexander Woolcott'8 eccen-
tricities and interest in unsolved murders) ; Oolumbia Pictures 
Corp. v. Krasna, 65 N.Y.S.2d 67 (both stories involved the 
writing of letters to a soldier overseas by an adolescent girl 
posing as her own older sister) ; and C •• v. Uf&ivenal Piot.,.a 
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Corp., 47 F.Supp. 1013 (alleged infringement was based on 
the common use of a sequence in which a storm forces the hero 
and heroine to take overnight refuge in a church loft; see. also, 
Dymow v. Bolto1l, 11 F.2d 690, 692: Kustoff v. Chaplin. 120 
F.2d 551. 561; Lewys v. O'Net'll, 49 F.2d 603, 607; Dellar v. 
Samuel Goldwyn, tnc., 40 F.Supp. 534, 536; Rush v. Our.~ler, 
39 F.2d 468. 472-473; Rosen v. Loew's, 11Ic., 162 F.2d 785, 
788; Eichel v. Marcin. 241 F. 404. 408-409; Lowe1lfels v. 
Nathan, 2 F .Supp. 73. 80: Gropper v. Warner Bros. Pic tu.res , 
Inc., 38 F.Supp. 329, 332; Affiliated Enterprises v. Gruber, 
86 F.2d 958. 961; Caruthers v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 
20 F.Supp. 906. 907: Christie v. Harris, 47 F.Supp. 39, 42, 
d'd. sub. 110m., Christie v. Cohan, 154 F.2d 827.) 
If. however, the finding of copying is supported by evidence 
of similarity between two works with respect to the expression 
and development of their common plot in a concrett' form 
and sequence of events marked by the first authQr's crafts-
manship and creative talent, a judgment for plaintiff based 
thereon will be affirmed, as in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn PiI>-
tures Corp., 81 F.2d 49. In that case. plaintiff's play was 
based on the 1857 trial in Scotland of a young woman named 
Madeleine Smith, on the charge that she murdered a discarded 
lover to prevent his revelation of their former intimacy to her 
present fiance. "This was the story which the plaintiffs used 
to build their play. As will appear they took from it but the 
). merest skeleton, the acquittal of a wanton young woman. who 
to extricate herself from im amour that stood in the way of 
I', 8 respectable marriage, poisoned her lover. The incidents, 
the characters, the mis en scene, the sequence of events, were 
( 'all changed; nobody disputes that the plaintiffs were entitled 
~ :to their copyright. All that they took from the story they 
!might probably have taken bad it even been copyrighted." 
~.' (81 F.2d at 50.) From this "merest skeleton'J plaintiffs 
i. developed an original story of sensuality and murder sug-, 
gested by th~ events upon which it was based. Defendant's 
!'motion picture presented not just a similar story based on 
f' the same facts (which would have been permissible even if it 
were suggested by plaintiff's play), but substantially the same 
details, sequence of events. manner of expression and develop-
';ment, and often the same dialogue. that gave plAintiffs' play its 
;;; . character of originality and concreteness of form. The Second 
~)Circnit Court of Appeals reversed a decree of dismissal. stating 
that although plaintiffs could not preclude any subsequent 
'.£l.i,~: 
) 
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use of the same source of material or story outline or the delib-
erate borrowing of their plot, they were entitled to protection 
against piracy of their original contribution to that plot in 8 
concrete form. Since similarity between the two works Willi 
manifested by a parallelism of incident and detail originally 
developed by plaintiffs, an inference of copying was held to 
be reasonable. In DB Acosta v. Bro'W1&, 146 F.2d 408, 410, 
both works were based ~n the . life of Clara Barton,but there 
was similarity between them in the names of seven principal 
characters (of the six fictional names one accidentally mis-
spelled name in plaintiff's story was identically reproduced 
in defendant's), in a fietional romance between Miss Barton 
and a young gold prospector even as to the details of its 
genesis and termination, and in the complete sequential de-
velopment of the story outline. The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, emphasized 
that the finding of infringement was supported by evidence of 
similarity in expression and development and not by similarity 
in the plot of the two storif'.8 or in their use of historical 
material. (See, also, Bars/,a v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 32 Cal. 
App.2d 556, 561 [90 P.2d 371], and Universal Picturu 00., 
Inc. v. Harold Lloyd Oorp., 162 F.2d 354, 360, in which judg-
ments for the plaintiffs were held supported by evidence of the 
use of identical comedy sequences originally developed by 
the plaintiffs, not by similarities resulting· from the use of 
the same plot.) 
Admittedly, both play and picture in the present case 
utilize the same basic plot, the story of a paranoiac ship's 
captain obs:essed by his position and authority, engaged by 
an opponent aboard his ship, and defeated by that opponent 
and by his own meIf-tal collapse. If a plot apart from its 
expression in a concrete form were protectible. the first use of 
this. plot would have withdrawn from all subsequent use a 
most fertile field for the production of stories of the sea. The 
captain and his opponent have long been stock sea story 
material. They were present in the persons of Captain Bligh 
and Fletcher Christian of "Mutiny on the Bounty," of Wolf 
Larsen and Humphrey van Weyden of "The Sea Wolf," and 
in the principals of numerous other stories of ships and the men 
who man them. It is immaterial, however, whether the plot 
common to play and picture is old or new; the only protection 
plaintiffs can claim under copyright law is limited to its 
,expression and development in a concrete form. In the present 
ease there is no substantial evidence of similarity betweea the 
) 
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play and picture with respect to the features protected b, 
copyright. "When one attempts comparison of the two works, 
in those matters as to which copyright protects-that is, the 
spirit or soul infusing the creatures of the author's imagina-
tion, what they desire, and how they go about achievement, the· 
reasons for their actions, and the words in which such reasons 
are expretlSed-I can see nothing but differences." (FraMsl 
v. lnoin. 34 F.2d 142, 144; MacDonald v. Du Maurier, W 
F.Supp. 655, 662.) 
Plaintifl' .. ' captain (Crawley) is an impostor, an actor who 
knows nothhl( of seamansrUp, who has killed the real captain 
to get aboal'd the boat and bring about the death of an enemy 
(Brancato) he believes has ruthlessly stifled the acting ability 
that he (Crawley) may now display. He exults in the power he 
possesses, but only because he holds it by virtue of his ability 
to act the part of the captain. He is obsessed by his art, not 
by his authority. He challenges Brancato to expose him, to 
demonstrate that by his consummate acting he can make others 
believe only what he wants them to believe. He kills only 
because murder is necessary to the maintenance of his pre-
tense. He hates Brancato and attempts to drive him to suicide. 
When he believes he has accomplished his purpose, he takes his 
own life in fear and remorse. The form and development of 
thili story, the embellishment of incident and detail, give the 
play the stamp of plaintiffs' originality and entitle it to pro-
tection, but only against piracy of the protectible features. 
Defendants. however, have taken from plaintiffs' play, if 
anything, only that whi~h is common property. In order to use 
an old ship set not then in use, they used a story outline a 
great deal older and more timeworn. They added to it nothing 
, not already in the public domain; certainly they added to it no f ingredient for which plaintiffs can claim protectioll. Their 
t, . story was built on a tyrannical captain, his abuse of authority, 
and his eventual defeat. Their captain (Stone) is a veteran 
of the sea, competent and experienced. Pride in his authority 
has become an obsession, driving him insane. He kills only 
to prove his authority .. He does not hate his opponent, Mer-
t riam, whose only common denominator with plaintiffs' Bran-
cato is his opposition to an insane captain. He does not com-. 
mit suicide,but is killed to prevent the murder of Merriam. 
"This incomplete skeleton the two plays have in common, but 
~ it is with real difficulty that the' flesh and blood, the incidental, 
yet essential, adornment and trimming, of the plays can be 
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cut away to show similarity between a few bones." (Dymow 
v Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692.) Here, as in Stanley v. C.B.S., 
ante, p. 653 l221 P.2d 73], defendant's motions for non-
suit, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict raised the question whether there \vas substantial evi-
dence of relevant similarity to justify the submission of the 
ease to the jury for a determination whether that similarity was 
the result of copying. In denying the motions, the trial court 
erroneously determined that there was suhstantial evidence 
of relevant similarity. In reversing the judgment, this court 
would not be substituting its judgment for that of the jury 
on a question of fact, but would determine merely that there 
was insufficient . evidence to support a finding of copying. 
(Nickols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 }I'.2d 119, 121, 122; 
Hewitt v. Coward, 41 N.Y.S.2d 498,500; Dorsey v. Old Surety 
Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 874; Soy Food Milu, Inc. v. Pills-
bury Mills, Inc., 161 F.2d 22, 25.) I would therefore reverse 
the judgment. 
Spence, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. 
Certainly there was no necessity for the defendants to read 
plaintiffs' "The Man and His Shadow" in order to obtain the 
"basic plot," or its subordinates, as depicted in "The Ghost 
. Ship"; they needed only to turn to "The Universal Plot 
Catalog" (Henry Albert Phillips) or to "Story Plotting Sim-
plified" (Eric Heath). In the last named work (which ad-
mittedly only suggests further subclassi:fications or applica-
tions of the fundamental law] proclaimed by Georges poltr') 
we find in chapter XIX (subsituation 15 of the sixteenth situa-
tion) the following listing : 
"Madman Victim 
c. A sea-captain His crew 
And in chapter XXVII we find: 
"Superior Rival Inferior Rival 
., A sea-captain His first mate 
The Cause" 
Insanity" 
The Object" 
A native girl" 
L, 'There are only thirty-six fund8.mental dramatie 8ituatiOn.ll, varioua 
facetll of which form the basis of all human drama." ("The Thirty-Six 
Dramatic Situations," by Georges Polti, 1916.) 
'Recognition of the "Jaw" antedates Polti; Goethe reJates tha~ 
"Gozzi maintained that there can be but thirty-six tragic [dramatic] 
aituations. Schiller took great pains to find more. bm Jwa ... 1DI&ble te 
tiIWi ..... 10 JaU.)' as Gozai." 
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These situations, it seems to me, are too well and widely 
known and have been too often written about, to admit of 
present proprietorship in them merely as such. They might be 
used in something original but they are not original. Yet it 
is only in relationship to these situations that any similarity 
between play and picture can be found. They fit ., The 
Ghost Ship" almost precisely; indubitably they constitute the 
so-called "basic plot" or "central core" of the pictured story; 
they fit it far more closely than does any situation portrayed 
in plaintiffs' sketch; and they were free to defendants' use. 
Plainti1l's' sketch, likewise, uses formulae plot and sub-
ordinates. It avails of a mad sea-captain, a passenger instead 
of a crewman, and, as the cause, descends to jealousy-mad 
jealousy. Jealousy, in the Thirty-Second Situation of Polti, 
is labeled "Mistaken Jealousy." "The reason," says Heath, 
"is that jealousy in itself is not dramatic." Even "Mistaken 
Jealousy" has poor emotional value and "the usual solution 
[which plaintiffs have adopted] ... -a murder, suicide, 
divorce, or separation-is extremely hackneyed and undra-
matic." (Italics added.) Plaintiffs' use of the equally hack-
neyed "pursuit-escape" technique and" A hurricane A vessel 
Seamanship" may be found clearly depicted and specifically 
listed in Heath's exposition of Polti's law. (Fifth Situation, 
chap. VIII.) 
Regardless of whether similarity or protectibility should be 
first determined it seems obvious in this case that plaintUf 
cannot recover. The majority opinion admits that "the basic 
- dramatic core of the plaintiffs' play constitutes the truly 
original and valuable feature of'it . . . [That,] in the present 
f case, the plaintiffs' property rights extend only to the dramatic 
i,' core ... " It might as well be claimed on behalf of plainti1l's 
i,' that they possess a common law copyright to the origination 
and use of some certain word already in common usage. To see 
~-'. f if the claim to originality and proprietorship in such com-
t bination of letters could possibly be tenable we should first 
\ .. turn to a dictionary and' if we found that combination as a 
; recognized word in the "public domain" of the English 
language we should go no further in listening to plaintiffs' 
claim. Here we need only turn to the dramaturgic equivalent 
of a dictionary-a catalog of plots in the public domain of 
. literature-to find the "central core"-the admittedly sole 
t basis of plaintiffs' claim of a protectible element. 
, So far as I know, no copyrights or other forms of literary 
) 
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protection have heretofore been granted as to the literary use 
of madmen, sea-captains or murders, as such. I find nothing 
of literary novelty in the portrayal, by either plaintiffs or 
defendants, of dominant and secondary characters; nor in the 
concept that a ship's captain has supreme authority over his 
command on the high seas and may demonstrate a mad llist for 
or brutal exercise of power; nor in the proposition that a 
paranoiac may captain a ship or be a killer; nor in the manner 
; ... hi,,}, t}, .... hnv .... l .. m .. nt.R. 01' anv of them. have been put 
.lU .,. ................ ... ...... '" _w" .. "'" ...... _-_ ... __ , .- --'" - - i : _ 
together by either plaintiff's or defendants. In any event the 
similarity, if any, between the story by plaintiffs and the pic-
ture by defendants lies exclusively in the plots which are in 
the public domain, not in the treatment thereof which origi-
nality could make protectible. 
As I view the film, if it possesses any quality at all which may 
be said to give it character, originality or any element of 
literary protectibility. that quality would seem to be a com-
bination of details in production, an imprint of the artistries 
of director and actor. But, insofar as plot or, as the majority 
denominate it, "central core," is concerned, I am satisfied .that 
neither the story told by plaintiffs nor that pictured in the 
film, can be said to possess in this decade any element of origi-
nality qualifying it to be the subject of exclusive literary prop-
erty rights and protectibility. In some aspects each plot is at 
least as old as Shakespeare' and. since Polti, the whole sub-
stance of each has been but a published formula. And if either 
work does possess originality in substance, structure or form 
sufficient to make it protectible as literary property, then, 
measured by an equal standard, it surely follows that the film 
is so different from plaintiffs' story as to preclude plaintiffs' 
recovery for plagiarismJ . 
The Ghost Ship sailed but I think neither it nor its author 
was engaged in piracy; and I think upholding the judgment 
in this case supports a result which approaches closer to 
piracy than did any act of the defendants. Certainly the 
individual writer should have ample protection for his literary 
enterprise but zeal to protect him should not lead to strait-
jacketing producers against what appears here to have been 
but a legitimate exercise of their own freedom of enterprise 
in an open field. 
"See MacBeth, Hamlet, Othello, King Lear; lee also the works listed b,. 
Polti UDder exampks of the Twent;r-Fourth Situation, subela88i11.catiOll 
A. (IJ). 
-') 
J 
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For the reasons stated 1 would reverse both the judgment 
and the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstand. 
ing the verdict. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied August 31, 
1950. Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., voted for a 
rehearing. 
